PhD defence: Corporate Governance During Market Transition: Heterogeneous responses to institutional tensions in China
In his dissertation ‘Corporate Governance During Market Transition: Heterogeneous responses to institutional tensions in China’, ERIM’s Pierre-Olivier Tremblay explores the barriers to successful corporate governance in transition economies. Through two empirical studies, Pierre-Olivier Tremblay uncovers the causal complexity involved in corporate governance problems in Chinese firms, shedding light on the challenges of successful corporate governance faced by companies in transition markets.
Pierre-Olivier Tremblay defended his dissertation in the Senate Hall at Erasmus University Rotterdam on Friday, 25 September 2015, at 9:30. His supervisor was Professor Barbara Krug. Other members of the Doctoral Committee were Dr. Patrick Reinmoeller (RSM), <link people frank-wijen>Dr. Frank Wijen (RSM), and Professor Bart Cambré (Antwerp Management School).
About Pierre-Olivier Legault Tremblay
Pierre Olivier L. Tremblay was born in 1982 in Montréal. He obtained an undergraduate degree in finance from HEC Montréal. During his degree, he completed two terms at ESADE in Barcelona and a summer program in leadership with the Iacocca Institute at Lehigh University. His academic and extracurricular achievement earned him several distinctions, including the Lieutenant Governor Award, the Mercure excellence profile and excellence scholarships from Fondation Bouthillier-Dubord, Promo 96 Fund, Sun Chemicals Inc. and a National Excellence Scholarship of the Canadian Millennium Foundation.
Pierre-Olivier earned an Msc. in international political economy at the London School of Economics (LSE) where his dissertation analyzed Vietnam’s accession to the WTO. He then worked for the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE), a Brussels based think tank, producing research and policy briefs on Sino-European trade relations. He also worked as inter-scholar in the Assemblée Nationale du Québec, under a scholarship from the Fondation Jean-Charles-Bonenfant, producing research on provincial-level participation in international trade negotiations. Finally, he was hired by the Research Centre on International Studies (CÉRIUM) of the University of Montréal to produce studies on Quebec-India relations for the Government of Québec.
In 2009, Pierre-Olivier enrolled in the ERIM PhD program with the department of Organization and Personnel Management, under the supervision of Prof.dr. Barbara Krug, and became research associate of the China Business Centre. He conducted research on investor protection, corporate governance, political embeddedness, professionalization and internationalization of Chinese listed firms. In 2011, he was invited by Prof.dr. Kalun Tse for a research visit at the China Europe International Business School (CEIBS).
He is currently employed as a researcher and lecturer for the Centre Laurent Beaudoin at the University of Shebrooke, where he works in the Business Intelligence research unit. His current research interests include decision making science, social network analysis and political ties in Chinese listed firms, institutional flexibility and internationalization, and corporate governance. His work has been presented in various academic conferences, including the Chinese Economic Association conference, EGOS and Prebem, and published in Chinese Economy and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation Magazine.
Thesis Abstract
Corporate governance in transition economies does not fit in the dominant normative models. China embodies institutional tensions between an inherited system of political governance and new laws transplanted from Western countries that empower external shareholders on capital markets.
The two empirical studies in this dissertation apply set theoretic methods on large samples of Chinese listed firms to uncover the causal complexity involved in corporate governance problems, focusing on the complementarities, functional equivalence and causal asymmetry. The first study analyses the configurations that facilitate and deter the most salient governance problem: the diversion of cash flow from the firm by controlling shareholders through tunneling. The second study analyses the diversity of governance forms in successful firms, including politically embedded firms, those that rely on outsider control systems resembling the Anglo-American model, as well as creative hybrid forms.
The dissertation shows that, even in transition economies, property rights matter for allocating decision making rights between large and minority shareholders. Also, political connections matter, but not as much as is commonly assumed since many private firms operate profitably without any political ties. Finally, the thesis commands caution regarding the role of independent directors, who not only fail to provide effective monitoring on insiders, but often facilitate collusion easing tunneling behavior.
· View and download Pierre's dissertation
Photos: Chris Gorzeman / Capital Images
