How Do Board Ties Affect the Adoption of New Governance Practices? The Effects of Interfirm Hierarchical Power and Managerial Interest

This study investigates important triggers that bring information obtained through board interlocks into action. We suggest that hierarchical power of interlinked firms and managerial interest affect the impact of board ties on the adoption of stock option pay and board reform. Using a sample of over 3,500 firms in Japan, we find that sent ties –  reflecting managerial interest – and received ties that derive power from a hierarchical relationship between the focal firm and the interlinked firms affect the adoption decisions differently. We also find support for different moderating effects of firm performance between sent and received ties.

Biography
Anja Tuschke holds the chair of Strategic Management at the Munich School of Management at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich. Prior to joining the Munich School of Management, Dr. Tuschke held the position of a director at the Institute of Organization and HR Management at the University of Bern in Switzerland. Dr. Tuschke’s research interests revolve around the link between Strategic Governance, Leadership, and outcomes. She is particularly interested in how networks, top management compensation, and interactions of managers, boards and owners affect various strategic outcomes. In addition she does research on the selection and dismissal of top managers and board members. Her main teaching interests are in the field of Strategic Management. Dr. Tuschke is an active member of the academic community. She is currently on the editorial boards of the Academy of Management Journal, Strategic Management Journal, Business and Research, and Die Betriebswirtschaft. She also serves as a Chairperson for the IG “Strategic Leadership and Governance” of the Strategic Management Society.