Stakeholder Theory and Managerial Discretion
Speaker
Abstract
| It is commonplace in management scholarship to include remarks on the "managerial implications" of the phenomenon under consideration. In at least this instrumental sense, most management theories contain some prescriptive element. Stakeholder theory is no exception – in fact, stakeholder theory explicitly includes normative as well as instrumental prescriptions. The central questions in the field of stakeholder management -- “What effects can a firm’s treatment of its stakeholders have on its performance?” and “What moral obligations do firms have toward their stakeholders?” – share a common purpose: to imagine new directions for firm-stakeholder relationships and to offer, implicitly or explicitly, guidance for managerial action toward achieving these ends. Here, as in all prescriptive endeavors, it is axiomatic that “ought implies can.” In other words, any claim that a person should behave in a certain way necessarily assumes that it is possible to behave in that way. To date, stakeholder theorists have largely assumed that managers have extensive latitude to choose their course of action in managing firm-stakeholder relationships. However, this latitude is not without limits. Managerial action can be significantly constrained, often by the demands and preconditions set out by stakeholder groups themselves. Moreover, the extent of managerial discretion is itself influenced by the stakeholders' perceptions of their past treatment by the firm. In this note, we suggest that exploring the dynamic relationship between stakeholder management and managerial discretion offers interesting new directions for future research. |
| This will be an interactive seminar. Those who plan to attend are kindly requested to contact Niki den Nieuwenboer (nnieuwenboer@rsm.nl) to obtain the paper that will be discussed. |
| Contact information: |
| Niki den Nieuwenboer |
