dr. W. (Wouter) de Maeseneire

Sophisticated valuation techniques such as adjusted present value and real options, attract ever-increasing attention from theory and practice. A huge number of papers in the academic field provide various applications of these advanced tools, for instance valuing research and development, strategic alliances and real estate. Real options have also been used for valuing mergers and acquisitions. However, notwithstanding the rich knowledge about valuation models applicable for valuing takeovers, there remains a need to further develop theories about the distribution of the value creation between the targets and acquirers shareholders. In other words, what part of the value creation can the acquirer appropriate? Strategic management literature underlines the impact of possessing unique capabilities, and both the strategic and financial literature emphasize the role of information asymmetry in explaining value appropriation in acquisitions. In this dissertation both simple and more complex valuation models are discussed, and we propose a real option-game model that analyzes the acquirers value appropriation. In our valuation and value appropriation models, the specific resources and capabilities of the evaluator are considered. By explicitly taking the acquirer resources into account in the valuation analysis, and by developing a new application of a combined option-game model, this PhD thesis is taking a step in further bridging the gap between finance theory and strategic management.